Deposit market competition, costs of funding and bank risk by Ben R Craig & Valeriya Dinger
working
paper
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
09  05
Deposit Market Competition, Costs of 
Funding and Bank Risk
by Ben R. Craig and Valeriya DingerWorking papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland are preliminary materials circulated to 
stimulate discussion and critical comment on research in progress. They may not have been subject to the 
formal editorial review accorded ofﬁ  cial Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland publications. The views stated 
herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or of 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Working papers are now available electronically through the Cleveland Fed’s site on the World Wide Web: 
www.clevelandfed.org/research.Working Paper 09-05 June 2009
Deposit Market Competition, Costs of Funding and Bank Risk
by Ben R. Craig and Valeriya Dinger
This paper presents an empirical examination of the effects of both deposit 
market competition and of wholesale funding on bank risk simultaneously. The 
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disciplining role of the charter value. In this project we argue that if the struc-
ture of bank liabilities and the costs of retail and wholesale funding are jointly 
determined with bank risk, the omission of wholesale funding in the empirical 
analysis of the relation between deposit market competition and risk may give 
rise to a substantial bias in the estimated results. This will be especially the case 
where wholesale lenders “screen” their borrowers’ risk as argued by the market 
discipline literature. We propose a new approach to the estimation of the relation 
between deposit market competition and bank risk which accounts for the oppor-
tunity of banks to shift to wholesale funding when deposit market competition is 
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1.  Introduction 
Following the process of bank market liberalization, deposit market competition in the US has 
substantially  intensified  during  the  last  two  decades.  It  has  often  been  argued  that  the 
liberalization and the resulting increased competition have contributed both to an increased 
fragility  of  individual  banks  and  of  the  banking  system  as  a  whole  (see  Keeley,  1990; 
Hellmann, et al. 2000; Allan and Gale, 2004). The argument usually goes as follows: when 
bank market competition (and deposit market competition, in particular) is intense, banks 
have to pay higher interest rates on retail deposits. The high deposit interest rates in turn result 
in an increase in the risk level of asset portfolios that is optimal for the bank.  
This argument, however, ignores the availability of wholesale funding which has gradually 
become a major source of funding for a wide range of commercial banks. When a bank loses 
its market power in the retail deposit market, the cost of wholesale funding decreases relative 
to the cost of retail deposits and ceteris paribus the bank’s demand for wholesale funds will be 
shifted upwards. However, the costs and availability of wholesale funding are related to the 
risk  of  the  bank  since  wholesale  liabilities  are  not  covered  by  explicit  deposit  insurance 
schemes (Rochet and Tirole, 1996; DeYoung et al, 1998; Ashcraft, 2007; King, 2008; Dinger 
and von Hagen, 2009, etc). In this line of argument the structure of bank liabilities, the costs 
of retail deposits and the cost of wholesale funding are jointly determined with bank risk.  
The  goal  of this  paper is an  empirical examination of the effects of  both deposit market 
competition and of wholesale funding on bank risk simultaneously. The traditional view of 
the relation between competition and risk has focused on the disciplining role of the charter 
value. In this paper we argue that if the structure of bank liabilities and the costs of retail and 
wholesale funding are jointly determined with bank risk, the omission of wholesale funding in 
the  empirical  analysis  of  the  relation  between  competition  and  risk  may  give  rise  to  a   3 
substantial bias in the estimated results. This will be especially the case where wholesale 
lenders  “screen”  their  borrowers’  risk  as  argued  by  the  market  discipline  literature.  We 
propose a new approach to the estimation of the relation between deposit market competition 
and bank risk which accounts for the opportunity of banks to shift to wholesale funding when 
deposit market competition is intense. 
Convincing empirical evidence on the issue is needed to determine policy recommendations, 
since wrong policy can lead either to inefficient banking industries and thus endanger the 
efficiency  of  financial  intermediation  and  capital  allocation,  or  to  a  very  fragile  banking 
system, which could potentially jeopardize payment systems and liquidity provision
1.  
The focus of this paper on deposit market, rather than loan market, competition is motivated 
by several issues. First, the most recent financial turmoil showed that banks with a weak 
deposit market position were more vulnerable. Here, we empirically analyse this anecdotal 
argument. Second, the theoretical research yields clear results for the deposit market, whereas 
the effect of loan market competition is ambiguous. Therefore, in this paper we confront a 
theoretically less controversial hypothesis with the data. Moreover, deposit markets are more 
local  than  loan  markets,  resulting  in  more  precise  market  definitions  and  competition 
measures for deposits relative to loans. And finally, deposit products are characterized by a 
higher degree of homogeneity relative to loans
2, which again simplifies the characterization of 
the  intensity  of  bank  competition  by  reducing  the  number  of  required  control  variables. 
Having said this, we also present specifications of the empirical model including loan market 
competition proxies to avoid a potential bias in the estimations from omitting the intensity of 
loan market competition.  
                                                
1 Allen and Gale (2004) show that financial system instability might be efficient and is therefore not necessarily 
undesirable. Policymakers, however, are often reluctant to face the short-term political cost of dealing with 
financial instability (as the experience from most recent financial crises clearly illustrates). 
2 A precise analysis of loan market competition would require information on key borrowers’ characteristics 
which is publicly not available.   4 
The analysis is based on a unique comprehensive dataset which combines retail deposit rates 
data (from BankRate Monitor, Inc) with Call Report data on bank characteristics and with 
data on local deposit market features (form the FDIC Summary of Deposits) for a sample of 
589 US banks. 
In our research framework we depart from the existing analysis of competition and risk in 
several  dimensions,  in  addition  to  explicitly  modeling  the  market  for  wholesale  funds  as 
discussed above.  
First, we concentrate on the intensity of deposit market competition faced by each individual 
bank, whereas most of the existing empirical studies have employed market-level competition 
proxies such as concentration ratios, Herfindahl indices, or Panzar-Rose H-statistics
3. Such 
average competition proxies are  not only unable to disentangle deposit from loan market 
competition; they also assume that all banks operating in the same local market face the same 
intensity  of  competition.  This  assumption  is,  however,  too  stark,  since  depending  on  the 
different  facets  of  competition,  banks  might  exert  different  degrees  and  forms  of  market 
power within the same local market. To this end, we use the deposit rate itself offered by the 
bank in each of the local deposit markets as a measure of the intensity of deposit market 
competition faced by this bank
4,5,6.  
                                                
3 We are aware of only three other empirical studies which employ bank level competition measures. Schaeck 
and Cihak (2008) use the Boone indicator (Boone, 2008) as a competition measure. This indicator does not 
distinguish between deposit and loan market power of the bank. Jimenez et al (2007) measure deposit and loan 
market competition separately by the deposit, resp. the loan market Lerner index of the bank. They, however, 
have only aggregate retail rate data for each of the sample banks and no information about the rates in the 
different local markets. Berger et al (2008) employ a bank level overall Lerner index reflecting output and input 
prices in both the deposit and loan market. 
4 To our knowledge, Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996) are the first to use deposit rates offered by a bank relative 
to a wholesale rate (the T-bill rate) as a proxy for the monopoly rent extracted by the bank in the deposit market. 
Similarly, the approach of Jimenez et al. (2007) of measuring deposit market competition by the deposit market 
Lerner index is based on the relation between deposit rates and a wholesale (the money market) rate.  
5 In the robustness checks section we present results based on an alternative bank-level measure of the intensity 
of deposit market competition suggested by Goyal (2005), namely the ratio of demand to total deposits. 
6 Alternatively, a bank’s market power can be proxied by the local market share of the bank. However, as noted 
by Kiser (2003) market power will be only noisily measured by the market share since even small banks with a 
negligible market share can exert some market power if depositors’ switching costs are high.   5 
Next,  our  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  the  (joint)  estimation  of  a  system  of  equations 
modelling deposit rates, costs and volume of wholesale funding and bank risk simultaneously. 
In this way we not only control for the endogeneity of wholesale funding and risk but also 
account for the potential endogeneity of deposit rates with respect of bank risk.  
The results of our empirical analysis point to a robust, positive, statistically and economically 
significant relation between the deposit rates offered by a bank and its asset portfolio and 
default risk. That is, banks with less deposit market power pursue riskier strategies. These 
results support the implications of the charter value paradigm. Moreover, we show that they 
are robust to including the wholesale market in the analysis. Our results are also consistent 
with the results of a range of earlier theoretical and empirical studies on market discipline and 
show a positive relation between the cost of funding and bank risk. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a short overview of the 
underlying theoretical and empirical arguments of the relation between retail and wholesale 
deposits and bank risk and states the main hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 
illustrates  the  econometrical  model  and  our  identification  strategy.  Section  5  reveals  the 
results of the empirical estimation, and Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Deposit market competition, markets for wholesale funds, and bank risk 
Following the theoretical model by Allen and Gale’s (2000) the main hypothesis of this study 
is that deposit market competition is positively related to bank risk. In the framework of this 
theoretical model intense bank competition results in high deposit rates which in turn shift 
upwards the optimal risk level chosen by a bank. Following this argument we focus on the 
impact of retail deposit rates (as proxy for deposit market competition) on bank risk. 
Modern banks, however, have alternative sources of funding other than retail deposits. As 
already mentioned, retail funds now represent only around 50% of bank liabilities. Therefore,   6 
if we focus on the costs of retail deposits alone in a study of bank risk we will ignore a 
significant share of alternative liabilities. That might give rise to a substantial omitted variable 
bias, especially if the risk shifting mechanism works through the interest rate banks pay on 
their liabilities (as suggested by Allen and Gale’s, 2000 model). To this end we include the 
cost of alternative wholesale funds as an additional explanatory variable.   
A simple reduced-form model of risk as a function of deposit and wholesale rates could, 
however, produce biased results since both retail deposit rates and the rates banks pay on 
wholesale liabilities might be endogenous with respect to risk. In our identification scheme 
we not only focus on the endogeneity of wholesale and retail rates but also account for the 
relationship between retail and wholesale funding suggested by Kiser (2003) and Park and 
Pennacchi (2008). To control for these interactions we employ a zero restriction identification 
strategy  based  on  estimating  separate  equations  for  bank  risk,  retail  deposit  rates  and 
wholesale  rates  using  a  set  of  instrumental  variables  for  each  of  the  three  endogenous 
variables. 
Finding, as we do below, that high retail deposit rates correspond to higher risk preferences 
can, on the one hand, be interpreted as support for the charter-value hypothesis (if banks 
expect high returns from their deposit market participation, they will not risk losing their 
charter by undertaking excessively risky projects). On the other hand, consistent with Allen 
and Gale’s model, the results can imply that when banks have to pay a high rate on their 
liabilities, their risk preferences are shifted upwards
7. Note that this is true both for retail and 
for wholesale liabilities.  
                                                
7 This result is also consistent with the implications of a more general model of the risk effects of the costs of 
funding for firms with limited liability (see Freixas and Rochet, 1997).   7 
3.  The econometric model 
The idea of our empirical model is to estimate the relationship between bank risk and deposit 
market  competition  taking  into  account  the  substitutability  between  retail  and  wholesale 
funds. Reflecting the arguments presented in Section 2, the model starts with a main equation 
describing the impact of deposit and wholesale rates on bank risk:  
) , , ( , , , , controls w d f r t i t j i t i =         (1)   
where r denotes the risk of the bank, d the retail deposit rates and w the wholesale rate.  The 
subscripts  i,  j,  and  t  refer  to  the  bank,  the  local  market  (MSA),  and  the  time  period, 
respectively.  Accounting  for  the  simultaneity  of  risk  and  retail  and  wholesale  rates  we 
identify the model using a zero restriction identification strategy
8. We explicitly model the 
reverse causality by the following equations:  
) , , ( , , , , controls w r f d t i t i t j i =         (2) 
) , ( , , controls r f w t i t i =          (3) 
Equation (2) models the dependence of deposit rates on bank risk and the costs of wholesale 
funding.  Its  formulation  is  based  on  models  presented  by  Kiser  (2003)  and  Park  and 
Pennacchi (2008). In these models, loans are seen as the output in a production function that 
uses retail and wholesale funds as inputs. The assumption is then made that, whereas banks 
can have market power in the retail deposit market, they are price takers in the wholesale 
market. In this framework, Kiser finds that an exogenous rise in the wholesale rate is related 
to an increase in the optimum retail deposit rate offered by the bank. Following the same line 
of  argument,  Park  and  Pennacchi  (2008)  assume  that  only  large  multimarket  banks  can 
                                                
8  One  of  the reasons  we  prefer  a  static to a  dynamic identification  scheme (e.g.  one  based  on  lags  of  the 
dependent variable) is the rigidity of bank retail deposit rates which will imply that we might observe the same 
retail rate in two consequent quarters.   8 
borrow wholesale funds at an exogenously given wholesale rate
9. This access to wholesale 
funding makes large banks less aggressive when competing for retail funds. In both models 
the  availability  and  the  cost  of  wholesale  liabilities  are  important  determinants  of  retail 
deposit rates
10. In the formulation of the empirical model we use the interest rate on wholesale 
liabilities as a proxy for the availability and the costs of wholesale funds
11. 
Equation (3) describes the risk sensitivity of the wholesale funding rate
12. Wholesale rates are 
assumed  to  be  risk-sensitive  because  wholesale  creditors  adjust  the  interest  rate  to  the 
probability of the borrower’s failure since wholesale liabilities are not covered by deposit 
insurance. Furfine (2001), for example, proves that riskier banks pay higher rates on federal 
funds  borrowing.  Moreover,  Flannery  and  Sorescu  (1996),  DeYoung  et  al.  (1998),  and 
Morgan and Stiroh (2001) find that riskier banks pay higher interest on subordinated debt
13.  
3.1.  Measures of bank risk, deposit rate, and wholesale rates 
Existing empirical studies have so far employed different risk measures in their analysis. 
Boyd et al. (2006) and Schaeck and Cihak (2008), for example, concentrate on the risk of the 
bank measured by the z-score. These authors choose this risk measure because it is closely 
related  to  the  probability  of  default.  They  show  that  bank  competition  (measured  by  the 
                                                
9  In  order  to  relate  our  results  to  Park  and  Pennacchi’s  (2008)  model  we  explicitly  study  the  impact  of 
multimarket mergers on bank wholesale and retail rates and risk in a subsection of Section 4. 
10  An  alternative  approach  of  modeling  the  relationship  between  retail  and  wholesale  deposits  is  taken  by 
Jimenez et al (2007). These authors concentrate solely on the difference between wholesale and retail rates 
(deposit market Lerner index) as a measure of deposit market power and do not explicitly model the interaction 
between wholesale and retail rates. 
11 In the subsection on the estimation technique (3.5) we discuss the effects and treatment of the sample selection 
issue related to the rates on wholesale liabilities. 
12 Here we deviate from the simple Lerner indices approach presented by Jimenez et al (2007) which implicitly 
assumes that all banks, independent of their risk levels, face the same country-wide money market rates. 
13 To our knowledge the only study that relates wholesale funding, competition, and risk is Goyal (2005). In his 
empirical framework Goyal assumes that high bank competition is reflected in low bank charter value and high 
bank risk, and examines the effect of the charter value on the yield and the inclusion of covenants on bank 
subordinated debt. He finds that low charter values correspond to more covenants in the subordinated debt 
contract and higher subordinated debt yields.   9 
Herfindahl index or the concentration of the banking industry in Boyd et al, 2006 and the 
Boone indicator in Schaeck and Cihak, 2008) has a negative impact on risk when measured 
by this proxy. On the other hand, Jimenez et al. (2007) concentrate on the risk of the loan 
portfolio measured by the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans. They find that deposit 
market competition has no significant impact on asset risk, but loan market competition is 
positively related to the risk of a bank’s asset portfolio.  
In  order  to  deliver  results  comparable  to  those  earlier  studies,  we  present  alternative 
regression specifications using the z-score and the nonperforming loans ratio. Following Boyd 
et al. (2006), we compute the z-score as the ratio between the sum of a bank’s average return 
on assets (ROA) and capitalization (E/A = equity/total assets) and the standard deviation of 










= − .        (4) 
The z-score, therefore, presents information on how many standard deviations of the return on 
assets are needed to drive the bank into default. Banks with a low z-score are more likely to 
default. That is, the z-score is decreasing with bank risk. To alleviate the interpretation of the 
results and the comparison with the alternative risk measures we use the negative z-score as a 
risk proxy in the regressions. 
We followed Ashcraft in constructing our ratio of a nonperforming loans risk measure and use 
the ratio with a four-quarter lead
15. This differs from Jimenez et al. (2007), who use the 
                                                
14 Computed by using rolling windows of 8 quarters. 
15  Regression  specifications  using  the  current  (as  in  Jimenez  et  al.,  2007)  and  the  two-quarter-lead  of  the 
nonperforming loan ratios result in qualitatively the same results.   10 
current ratio of nonperforming loans. The intuition is that the risk of the current projects will 
only be reflected with a delay in the nonperforming loan ratios of the bank
16.  
When we turn to measuring deposit market competition, we adopt the bank’s retail deposit 
rates as a proxy for its deposit market competitive position for our baseline specification. Note 
that  the  fact  that  we  observe  bank  retail  rates  in  different  local  markets  (Metropolitan 
Statistical  Areas  –  MSAs)  allows  us  to  account  for  the  intensity  of  local  deposit  market 
competition  and  identify  the  deposit  rate  equation  using  the  variation  of  local  market 
characteristics across the MSAs. We also look at the share of demand deposits in the total 
deposits volume as a deposit market competition proxy (Goyal, 2005) as a robustness check. 
From the variety of deposit rates reported by Bankrate Monitor (checking accounts, money 
market deposit accounts, and certificates of deposits with a maturity of three months to up to 
five years), we choose the checking account rates as the most suitable for our exercise
17. This 
choice is motivated by the fact that previous research has documented that checking account 
rates are more sensitive to changes in the local bank market structure than money market 
deposit  rates  (Hannan  and  Prager,  1998,  Craig  and  Dinger,  2008),  whereas  rates  on 
certificates of deposits do not significantly react to such changes.  
And finally, in our baseline specification, we use the interest rate on federal funds purchased 
as a proxy for the costs of the wholesale funding. Purchased federal funds are liabilities with 
very short maturity and thus not perfect substitutes for retail deposits. The rate a bank pays on 
purchased federal funds is, however, shown to be closely correlated with alternative bank 
wholesale liabilities (such as subordinated debt, advances from Federal Home Loan Banks, 
                                                
16 As a robustness check we have rerun the model using the ratio of nonperforming loans to equity as a risk 
measure (again with a four-quarter lead). According to Ashcraft (2007), this is a better measure of bank risk 
since the capitalization of the bank affects the amount of nonperforming loans a bank can absorb before harming 
its creditors. The results of the estimation are very similar to those using the nonperforming loans to total loans 
as a dependent variable. 
17 We have rerun all regression specifications using the money market deposit account rates as a retail deposit 
rate measure. The results are qualitatively the same as in the case when the checking account rate is employed as 
retail deposit rate measure, although statistical significance is sometimes lower. Results are available from the 
authors upon request.   11 
and others), which are potentially better substitutes for retail deposits from a bank’s point of 
view. The advantage of purchased federal funds over these alternative wholesale liabilities for 
our  framework  is  that  we  have  fed  funds  observations  for  most  banks  in  our  sample
18. 
Moreover, comparison across banks is further alleviated by the fact that the fed funds market 
has a standardized “product”
19.  We follow King (2008) and approximate the interest rate on 
fed funds purchased by the ratio of “expense of federal funds purchased and securities sold 
under  agreements  to  repurchase”  (line  riad4180    in  the  Call  Report)  to  “federal  funds 
purchased  and securities sold under agreements to  repurchase” (line rcfd3353 in the Call 
Report)
20.  In  the  robustness  section  we  alternatively  estimate  the  model  using  the 
subordinated debt rate as a wholesale rate proxy. 
3.2.  Identification and Instruments 
Our identification follows a “zero restriction” strategy. Each of the endogenous variables are 
instrumented  by  a  suitable  set  of  instruments.  Econometric  theory  suggests  that  a  valid 
instrument  should  be  uncorrelated  with  the  error  term  but  strongly  correlated  with  the 
instrumented endogenous variable. Following, we instrument the endogenous variables in our 
model (retail deposit rate, rate on wholesale funding, and bank risk) by variables which have 
been  shown  by  earlier  research  to  be  strongly  correlated  with  the  respective  endogenous 
variable, but for which we can argue exogeneity with respect to the error terms, especially for 
those necessary equations in the system where they are not included as a right-hand variable.  
                                                
18 In order to account for the noise introduced in the fed funds rate data when the volume of fed funds liabilities 
is  negligibly  small,  we  introduce  a screen  based  on  the  share  of fed  funds liabilities in  total  assets  in  the 
estimation  of  equation  (3)  and    account  for  the  potential  selection  bias  by  using  a  Heckman  correction 
(Heckman, 1976).  
19 Alternative wholesale funding products bear a substantial nonprice component such as covenants (see Goyal, 
2005) which should be accounted for, for a precise comparison. Data about these are, however, unavailable for 
the broad range of banks included in our study.  
20 As King (2008) notes, this approximation includes the cost of securities sold under agreements to repurchase, 
which is a collateralized liability of the bank and might be less sensitive to bank risk. The fact that a substantial 
risk sensitivity is shown even when repos are included further strengthens our argument.   12 
In the case of retail deposit rates, we base our identification strategy on the assumption that 
banks control for local deposit market competition when setting their deposit rates
21. Here we 
borrow from the literature which has found that ratio of branches to deposits, the share of the 
branches of the bank, and the market size are significant  determinants of a bank’s retail 
deposit rates (see Prager and Hannan, 2004). We argue that these variables are only right-
hand variables for the deposit rate equation, not the wholesale rate or risk equations, and thus 
employ these variables as instruments for the retail deposit rate. The branches-to-deposits 
ratio is computed at the bank-market level as the ratio of the number of bank i’s branches in 
local market j to bank i’s total deposits in this market. The share of the branches is computed 
as the proportion of the branches of the bank to the total number of bank branches in the local 
market. The market size is the log of the population of the respective market. The underlying 
assumptions when using these variables as deposit rate instruments is that banks with more 
branches (better geographical proximity to retail customers) can attract deposits at lower rates. 
On the other hand, neither the wholesale rate nor the risk preference of the bank directly 
depends on the number of branches.  
The  instrumentation  of  the  wholesale  rate  in  the  deposit  and  risk  equations  focuses  on 
variables which affect the rate a bank pays on wholesale liabilities but do not have an impact 
on deposit rates and bank risk. Our major instrument for the wholesale fund is the average 
effective level of the federal funds rate (as announced by the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, based on its survey of four major brokers). The inclusion of this instrument follows the 
argument that the rate banks pay on wholesale liabilities reflects changes in the fed funds 
target rate set by the Fed.  We also use a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the 
bank belongs to a bank holding company and zero otherwise (BHC dummy), as an additional 
instrument  for  the  wholesale  rate.  The  intuition  behind  this  instrument  is  that  wholesale 
                                                
21 Note, that we observe substantial cross-market variation of retail rates within the multimarket banks (which we 
will discuss in our data section) in our sample which can be employed in the identification.    13 
funding is cheaper for banks that are members of large BHCs, but risk choice and deposit rate 
do not necessarily depend on BHC membership. Note that both the average fed funds rate and 
the BHC dummy are weak instruments because in each time period there’s no (or little as in 
the BHC dummy case) variation across banks. To strengthen identification we also include a 
dummy variable taking the value of one if the bank is a member of the Federal Home Loan 
Bank, and zero otherwise (FHLB dummy) as an additional instrument for the wholesale rate. 
The inclusion of this instrument follows King (2008) and Ashcraft, Bech and Frame (2008). 
These authors argue that advances from the Federal Home Loan Bank system are empirically 
relevant substitutes for other forms of wholesale borrowing. Their availability can, therefore, 
shift a bank’s demand for federal funds. 
A change in the effective fed funds rate is probably also related to the amount of risk taken on 
by the bank (see Jimenez et al, 2008), as well as the deposit rate it can charge
22. Since our 
system is overidentified, we also have tried including this variable in the deposit rate and the 
risk equation with little change in the results.  
The risk of a bank can be instrumented by the average economic conditions in the local 
markets where a bank operates. Cross-country evidence suggests that bank default risk (Boyd 
and de Nicolo, 2006) and nonperforming loans (Dinger and von Hagen, 2008) are negatively 
related to average income and economic growth. For the United States, Mian and Sufi (2008) 
demonstrate for the case of mortgage lending a negative relation between default rates and 
MSA  average  income.  Moreover,  theoretical  and  empirical  research  shows  that  lending 
standards depend on local economic growth (see Ruckle, 2004, for a discussion). General 
economic conditions are effective instruments because, although they significantly affect the 
risk of the banks  operating in the  local market,  they  do not have a direct impact on the 
                                                
22 Note that by including this instrument in the regressions we also control for the general interest rate level, so 
that variation in the checking account rate is then only related to cross-market and cross-bank variation and not 
to the general interest rate cycle.   14 
wholesale and deposit rates. Following this line of argument, we instrument the risk of a bank 
by the average household income in the markets where a bank operates (income) and the 
annual household income growth averaged across the markets where a bank operates (income 
growth).   
In the case of all instruments, the Stock-and-Watson-rule-of-thumb measure
23 confirms the 
strength of the instrument, and, in the case of multiple instruments, a Hansen test does not 
reject exogeneity of the instruments. 
3.3.  Control variables 
As suggested by earlier research, a few variables such as capitalization and bank size can 
affect all three dependant variables (Hannan and Hanwick, 1998, Furfine, 2001, Boyd et al, 
2006). To this end, we include as control variables in all three equations the ratio of bank 
equity to total assets as a measure of capitalization and the log of the bank’s total assets as a 
proxy for bank size. Moreover, as suggested by King (2008) the rate of loan growth might be 
an  important  determinant  of  the  wholesale  rate.  Since  the  loan  growth  rate  can  also 
significantly affect the retail deposit rates offered by the banks and the risk of their asset 
portfolio, we also include loan growth as a control variable in all three equations.  
3.4. Data and samples 
The analysis is based on a large dataset combining three main data sources. Deposit rates are 
drawn from BankRate Monitor, Inc. The data encompass deposit rates offered by 589 U.S. 
banks in 164 local markets (metropolitan statistical areas) for the period starting on September 
19, 1997, and ending on July 21, 2006.  
                                                
23 The so-called Stock and Watson rule of thumb (Stock and Watson, 2003) is often used as a proxy for the 
strength  of  an  instrument.  According  to  this  rule,  the  first-stage  F-statistic  testing  the  hypothesis  that  the 
coefficients on the instruments are jointly zero should be at least 10. In the case of the deposit rate instruments, 
the F-statistic is 14.5, for the wholesale rate instruments the F-statistic is 13.2, and for the risk instruments the F-
statistic is 12.4.   15 
We match the deposit rate data with a broad range of bank characteristics reported in the 
Quarterly Reports of Conditions and Income (Call Reports). BankRate Monitor deposit rate 
data have weekly frequency. To match the quarterly frequency of the Call Reports, we only 
use  the  deposit  rates  reported  on  the last  week  of  each  quarter.  We  also  include  control 
variables for the local markets. The source of the local-market controls is the Summary of 
Deposits, and these data are available only at an annual frequency.  
After merging our data we have a multidimensional panel dataset consisting of bank-level 
data (risk variables, bank size, capitalization), market-level data (HHI, market size, average 
income  of  the  MSA’s  population, income  growth,  etc)  and  bank-market-level  data  (retail 
deposit rates, share of the MSA’s branches, branches per deposit volume in the market, etc.).  
In the estimation of equations (1) and (3), bank-level dependent variables (the risk proxy and 
the rate on wholesale liabilities) are regressed on bank-market-level explanatory variables 
(e.g.,  deposit  rates).  In  this  case,  the  assumption  of  uncorrelated  error  terms  across  the 
observations may be violated (it is likely that observations of the same bank in different 
markets will show correlated error terms) resulting in potentially inconsistent estimates. We 
adopt three alternative approaches to deal with our multidimensional panel.  
First, we use the full sample of bank-market observations and cluster the standard errors by 
bank. In this step we deviate from a large body of the literature (e.g. Radecki, 1998; Park and 
Pennacchi, 2008) which assumes that multimarket banks charge uniform rates across local 
markets. We deviate from this assumption because our sample exhibits a high degree of cross-
market variation of multimarket banks’ pricing. The data presented in Table 1 illustrates that 
the variation in the deposit rates set by a multimarket bank in the different MSAs is equal to 
about one third of the variation of all deposits rates offered by all banks in a MSA. It is our 
assumption that the cross-market variation in the pricing of multimarket banks is suggestive 
for local market competitive conditions.   16 







deviation from the 




1998 0.25 0.18 0.07 0.03
1999 0.33 0.24 0.15 0.07
2000 0.33 0.24 0.13 0.08
2001 0.49 0.37 0.21 0.14
2002 0.60 0.43 0.17 0.14
2003 0.56 0.40 0.16 0.12
2004 0.80 0.53 0.27 0.13
2005 0.71 0.50 0.29 0.14
2005 1.05 0.70 0.20 0.15
2006 0.96 0.65 0.17 0.13
variation within the market
 
Note: Variation within the market is computed by first computing by local market the variation (standard deviation or mean 
absolute deviation from the mean) of the checking account rates offered by all banks. Then the variation is averaged across 
local  markets.  Variation  within  the  bank  is  computed  by  first  computing  by  multimarket  bank  the  variation  (standard 
deviation or mean absolute deviation from the mean) of the checking account rates offered in the various local markets. Then 
the variation is averaged across all multimarket banks. 
Second, we alternatively estimate the model on the bank level by computing the average 
values of the bank-market-level variables (deposit rate, average income, branches-to-deposits 
ratio, etc.). For each bank and time period, we compute the average value of each of these 
variables across all the local markets in which the bank operates. Through the aggregation, we 
achieve consistency of the estimated coefficients but lose information on the local deposit 
market intensity and dramatically reduce the number of observations, which in turn reduces 
the efficiency of the estimation. This estimation approach can only account for the variation 
across banks. It has, however, the advantage that it accounts for the possibility that banks 
reshuffle deposits across local markets. In this case, the average intensity of deposit market 
competition might be the one that matters for bank risk.  






checking account rate (in %) 18715 0.538 0.539 0.000 3.800
T-Bill three month (in %) 18715 3.361 1.769 0.880 6.210
effective fed funds rate (in %) 18715 3.535 1.949 0.938 7.125
rate on subordinated debt (in %) 13279 0.025 0.181 0.000 7.793
rate on federal funds purchased (in %) 17439 0.026 -0.823 0.002 100.335
Z-score 9679 78.820 94.260 2.575 492.196
NPL (in %) 12098 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.122
branch_deposit 16039 0.022 0.022 0.000 1.050
share of branches in the MSA 16039 0.116 0.066 0.001 0.390
BHCdummy  18715 0.947 0.225 0.000 1.000
average income in the MSAs  15581 32.257 16.367 5.672 375.689
average income growth in the MSAs 15581 0.050 0.024 -0.054 0.158 
 
Note: The ”raw” rates on wholesale liabilities before applying the screen of federal funds purchase > 0.05% of total assets 
and outstanding subordinated debt >0.05% of total assets are reposted in the table. 
And third, we estimate the model using the subsample of single-market banks (143 out of our 
sample of 589 banks operate in only one MSA). Single-market banks (SMBs) face deposit 
market competition in one market only, and their bank-level risk is related to the competitive 
conditions  in  only  this  deposit  market.  The  drawback  of  this  approach  is  that  we  again 
dramatically reduce our sample size.  
Table 2 illustrates descriptive statistics of the variables included in our estimations. It shows 
that the checking account rate varies between 0 and 3.8%. It is important to note that some of 
the variation is due to the time series dimension of our data. Our sample covers 1997 to 2006, 
which encompasses a period longer than a full interest rate cycle. The Z-score varies between 
2 and 492. The nonperforming loan ratios vary between zero and almost 12%. 
3.5. Estimation technique 
We  estimate  each  of  the  risk  and  deposit  rate  equations  using  a  two-stage  instrumental-
variable estimating technique with standard errors clustered for each bank. The estimation of 
the wholesale rate equation is more challenging because of the potential selection bias, which 
arises from the fact that if banks perceive that they have to pay a disadvantageous rate on their 
wholesale liabilities they may restrain from borrowing wholesale funds
24. Consequently, for 
                                                
24 These selection issues have been explicitly studied by King (2008).   18 
such banks we will observe no (or only negligible volumes) of wholesale funding. For these 
reasons we use the censored regression specification suggested by Heckman (1976) when 
estimating  the  wholesale  rate  equation.  Unless  the  share  of  wholesale  liabilities  is  large 
enough, the purchased funds are likely to represent unusual purchases made under extreme 
time  pressure  and  are  thus  unlikely  to  represent  the  price  of  wholesale  funds  as  deposit 
substitutes. Because of this, we did not include an observation in the estimated wholesale 
funds equation unless the volume of federal funds purchased represented at least 0.5% of the 
bank’s assets.
 25 The Heckman specification creates an auxiliary variable in the first stage, the 
“inverse Mills’ ratio,” which represents the bias caused by the censoring process. As noted by 
Heckman,  instrumental  variable  estimators  are  still  consistent,  once  the  predicted  inverse 
Mills’ ratio is included in the system
26. 
4.  Estimation results 
We first present the results of the baseline model, with the rate on federal funds purchased as 
a wholesale funding rate proxy and the checking account rate as a proxy of the intensity of 
deposit market competition. The results of this specification are illustrated in Table 3, which 
contains a column for each of the risk measures: negative z-score and the (four quarter lead of 
the) ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans (NPL). The results of this estimation show a 
statistically significant positive link between deposit rates and bank risk. In particular, a rise 
in deposit rates is associated with a raise in the negative z-score (which implies a lower 
distance  to  default  and higher  risk)  and  higher  relative  volumes  of  nonperforming  loans. 
These results are consistent with the theoretical prediction of the risk-enhancing impact of 
deposit market competition and are robust to the choice of the risk measure. Note that the 
                                                
25 As robustness check we have reestimated the model using both a fix volume of the federal funds purchased as 
a trigger point (1 Mio. USD, as in King, 2008) and alternative trigger values of the fed funds purchased share in 
total assets (0.01% and 1%). Results do not change qualitatively. 
26 Note that the Mill’s ratio is significant in the estimation of all specifications of the wholesale equaition.   19 
estimated coefficients suggest a relatively large economic significance of the results. So, a 
100 basis points relative difference in the checking account rate is associated with a 28 points 
drop in the Z-score and 9 basis points  higher non-performing loans ratio.  
The results of the estimation of the deposit rate equation in this baseline specification also 
confirm the positive link between bank risk and deposit rates. So, for example, banks with a 
high  z-score  are  expected  to  pay  lower  deposit  rates.  Similarly,  banks  with  high  relative 
volumes of nonperforming loans offer higher deposit rates. It is interesting to note that in 
these regression specifications we find a positive relation between the checking account rate 
and the rate on federal funds purchased. This result is consistent with the substitutability 
between retail and wholesale funding and confirms the implications of Kiser’s (2003) model.  
And finally, the results of the estimation of the wholesale rate equation suggest again that the 
rate on federal funds purchased is positively related to the retail deposit rate. This relation is, 
however, statistically significant only when the z-score is used as a risk proxy. The results 
also confirm a positive relation between bank risk and the cost of wholesale funding. This 
result is robust to the choice of the risk measure and is consistent with Furfine (2001), who 
also uncovers a positive relation between a bank risk and the rate paid on wholesale liabilities.  
Next, we re-estimate the model using a sample of observations averaged at the bank level. 
That is, for each bank and quarter we now use only one observation and cannot account for 
the market-level variation. By doing so, we control for the possibility that banks reshuffle 
deposits across local markets. The results of these estimations are presented in Table 4.   20 
Table 3: All banks; bank-market level observations; the wholesale rate is measured by the rate 







Dependant variable: bank risk
checking account rate 28.92 *** 5.78 0.09 ** 0.05
rate on federal funds purchased 833.97 *** 185.65 6.51 * 3.52
bank size -5.76 *** 1.98 -0.03 * 0.02
capitalization -419.83 *** 54.73 -1.13 * 0.68
loan growth 2.98 2.61 0.09 * 0.05
income 0.02 0.05 0.00 ** 0.00
income growth -200.82 56.62 -0.78 0.75
constant 32.09 36.12 0.69 ** 0.36
Observations 8162 13619
R-squared 0.05 0.04
Dependant variable: checking account rate
bank risk 0.02 *** 0.00 2.45 ** 1.14
rate on federal funds purchased 15.63 *** 6.86 38.34 *** 13.92
bank size 0.08 *** 0.03 -0.09 0.08
capitalization 3.25 *** 1.32 -0.87 ** 2.51
loan growth -0.11 * 0.06 -0.48 *** 0.20
branch_deposit 10.66 *** 2.66 5.27 6.89
branches share 1.46 * 0.83 9.04 *** 2.65
market size 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
constant 0.08 0.43 0.46 1.40
Observations 8162 10220
R-squared 0.06 0.06
Dependant variable: rate on federal funds purchased
checking account rate 0.07 *** 0.02 -0.05 0.20
bank risk -0.001 ** 0.00 1.35 ** 0.55
bank size  0.01 *** 0.00 -0.02 0.02
capitalization  0.04 * 0.02 -0.65 ** 0.27
loan growth  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
effective fed funds rate  -0.01 *** 0.00 -0.02 0.02
BHC dummy 0.05 *** 0.01 0.05 0.10
FHLB dummy -0.02 ** 0.01 -0.02 ** -0.01
constant -0.15 *** 0.04 0.49 0.43
Observations 13619 13619




Note: Two-stage least squares IV estimations. Endogenous variables are: bank risk (measured by z-score, NPL, checking 
account rate and the rate on fed funds purchased. The fed funds rate equation is estimated using a Heckman procedure to 
control for potential selection bias. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table  4:  All  banks;  bank  level  observations;  the  wholesale  rate  is  measured  by  the  rate  on 







Dependant variable: bank risk
checking account rate 24.74 *** 9.42 0.38 ** 0.20
rate on federal funds purchased 81.04 93.37 -1.10 1.56
bank size -0.20 3.31 -0.03 0.09
capitalization -93.87 89.44 -0.33 2.25
loan growth 6.70 * 3.71 0.01 0.05
income 0.16 0.18 -0.00 0.00
income growth -392.73 * 207.40 0.63 3.01
constant -83.57 56.99 0.57 1.43
Observations 1558 2159
R-squared 0.07 0.06
Dependant variable: checking account rate
bank risk 0.02 0.02 1.54 ** 0.76
rate on federal funds purchased 4.65 ** 2.14 2.16 3.28
bank size -0.15 0.19 -0.06 0.13
capitalization 0.47 4.24 -0.12 4.01
loan growth -0.06 0.15 0.00 0.09
branch_deposit 20.50 16.31 4.34 9.50
branches share 2.99 3.14 4.94 * 2.88
market size 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
constant 3.65 2.73 0.48 2.47
Observations 1558 2159
R-squared 0.03 0.04
Dependant variable: rate on federal funds purchased
checking account rate 0.007 0.027 -0.013 0.014
bank risk 0.000 0.000 0.063 0.313
bank size  0.000 * 0.004 -0.003 0.002
capitalization  -0.025 0.011 -0.020 0.011
loan growth  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
effective fed funds rate  0.801 ** 0.406 0.735 *** 0.263
BHC dummy -0.006 0.015 -0.015 0.012
FHLB dummy -0.021 ** 0.011 -0.019 ** -0.010
constant 0.013 0.076 0.066 0.038
Observations 3342 3342




Note: Two-stage least squares IV estimations. Endogenous variables are: bank risk (measured by z-score, NPL), checking 
account rate and the rate on fed funds purchased. Bank-market level variables are averaged at the bank level. The fed funds 
rate equation is estimated using a Heckman procedure to control for potential selection bias. *, **, *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Qualitatively, these results are very similar to the bank-market-level results presented in Table 
3. However, the reduced number of observations is reflected in the lower efficiency of the   22 
estimations. Nevertheless, the key result concerning the positive relationship between retail 
deposit  rates  and  bank  risk  is  also  confirmed  (significantly)  in  this  specification.  The 
estimated coefficients suggest a similar magnitude of the effect of deposit rates on the Z-
score. The effect of the checking account rates on the NPL is estimated to be of a larger 
magnitude in this specification.  
And finally, we estimate the model on the sample of banks operating in only one local market 
(see Table 5). In this case, we are again able to replicate the results for the full sample of 
banks.  These  results  are  important  because  they  confirm  the  existence  of  a  positive 
relationship between deposit rates and bank risk for a sample of banks for which we expect 
the strongest geographical link between deposit market characteristics and bank risk. Again, 
the small sample size results in relatively low efficiency of the estimations. 
In sum, we find a statistically and economically significant, and positive relation between the 
intensity of deposit market competition faced by a bank (measured by the retail deposit rate) 
and  its  risk  level.  Our  empirical  results,  therefore,  support  the  conclusion  of  a  series  of 
theoretical papers (e.g., Allen and Gale, 2000, and Boyd and de Nicolo, 2005) that intense 
deposit market competition results in high bank risk. Moreover, within a more comprehensive 
framework, our empirical model is able to replicate the results of earlier studies showing that 
the costs of wholesale funding depend on bank risk (DeYoung et al, 1998,  Morgan and 
Stiroh,  2001,  and  Furfine,  2001)  and  a  positive  relation  between  the  cost  of  retail  and 
wholesale funding (Kiser, 2003).    23 








Dependant variable: bank risk
checking account rate 50.06 154.71 0.79 ** 0.33
rate on federal funds purchased 44.74 12.25 9.69 13.20
bank size -4.09 35.19 0.07 0.14
capitalization -815.33 2308.43 1.99 3.36
loan growth -6.22 21.82 -0.60 0.82
income 0.05 0.33 0.00 0.00
income growth -192.06 422.99 -8.08 6.73
constant 31.73 603.26 -1.30 2.15
Observations 375 518
R-squared 0.04 0.05
Dependant variable: checking account rate
bank risk 0.06 *** 0.01 1.71 * 1.01
rate on federal funds purchased 77.74 *** 29.62 5.47 15.56
bank size -0.11 0.22 -0.25 0.35
capitalization -14.30 ** 6.63 -4.19 4.64
loan growth -0.12 0.12 -0.28 1.02
branch_deposit 6.15 18.78 -72.00 61.11
branches share -0.44 0.52 3.10 6.35
market size 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
constant 1.93 3.42 5.42 5.32
Observations 375 518
R-squared 0.03 0.06
Dependant variable: rate on federal funds purchased
checking account rate 0.04 0.06 0.93 0.87
bank risk 0.00 0.00 3.30 5.84
bank size  0.00 0.01 0.10 0.07
capitalization  0.01 0.04 0.18 0.40
loan growth  0.00 0.00 -0.04 ** 0.01
effective fed funds rate  0.52 * 0.29 0.54 0.30
BHC dummy 0.02 0.03 0.50 0.45
FHLB dummy -0.01 0.01 -0.02 * 0.01
constant -0.07 0.15 -2.03 1.91
Observations 823 823





Note: Two-stage least squares IV estimations. Endogenous variables are: bank risk (measured by z-score, NPL), checking 
account rate and the rate on fed funds purchased. Only observations of single-market banks The fed funds rate equation is 
estimated using a Heckman procedure to control for potential selection bias. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively.  
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5.  Robustness checks 
In  this  section  we  describe  a  series  of  alternative  estimations  performed  to  confirm  the 
robustness of the results.  
To start with, we include a proxy for loan market competition to control for the impact of a 
bank’s loan market competitive position on bank risk. We control for the intensity of loan 
market competition by including the ratio of loans in the balance sheet plus the volume of 
securitized loans to the total assets of the bank (loans to total assets) as a control for the 
bank’s market power in the loan market
27. The idea is that if a bank has a substantial market 
power in the loan market it will have a higher share of loans (which on average generate 
higher returns than alternative assets) in its portfolio
28. Since the bank can securitize and sell 
the loans after origination, we add the amount of securitized loans to on-balance sheet loans. 
Note  that  a  bank’s  loan  origination  might  also  affect  its  deposit  rates  and  the  costs  of 
wholesale funding. So, we include the loans to total assets as a control variable in all three 
equations of the model. The results of this model specification are illustrated in Table 6. The 
loans to total assets variable enters the regressions with statistically insignificant coefficients.  
The rest of the variables of interest enter the regressions with coefficient very similar to their 
coefficients  in  the  baseline  model.  In  particular,  checking  account  rates  are  positively 
significantly related to bank risk as measured by both the negative Z-score and the NPL. 
As another robustness check we introduce the rate banks pay on subordinated debt as an 
alternative  measure  of  the  cost  of  wholesale  liabilities.  Because  of  its  longer  maturity, 
subordinated debt can be considered as a better substitute for retail deposits than federal funds 
borrowed. Nevertheless, subordinated debt has other drawbacks for our research framework, 
                                                
27 The inclusion of more comprehensive loan market competition measures and the analysis of their interactions 
with deposit market competition is a planned extension of this research project. 
28 The intuition behind this proxy  of loan market competitiveness follows the intuition suggested by Goyal 
(2005) for using the demand deposits to total deposits as a proxy of the deposit market power of a bank.   25 
especially if we consider that subordinated debt issues might not be related to a shortage of 
retail funds but rather to the eligibility of subordinated debt as tier-2 capital. When  measuring 
the  subordinated  debt  rate,  we  follow  Kiser  (2003)  and  approximate  the  interest  rate  on 
subordinated  debt  by  the  ratio  of  “interest  on  subordinated  notes  and  debentures”  (line 
riad4200) and the amount of outstanding “subordinated notes and debentures” (line rcfd3200) 
of the Call Report. Again, when estimating the wholesale rate equation, we account for the 
potential selection issue by estimating a Heckman model with instrumental variables
29. The 
results of the estimation of this model specification are illustrated in Table 7. 
In this case, we are again able to document a positive relation between the retail rates offered 
by a bank and its risk. Furthermore, we confirm the positive relation between the subordinated 
debt rate and the risk of the bank (as already shown by DeYoung et al., 1998, and  Morgan 
and  Stiroh,  2001)  and  a  positive  link  between a  bank’s  subordinated  debt  rate  and  retail 
deposit rates (as shown by Kiser, 2003).  
Next we re-estimate our model using the share of demand deposits to total deposits as a proxy 
for a bank’s competitive position in the deposit market. Here, we follow Goyal (2005), who 
argues that if banks have a monopoly power in the deposit market, this will be reflected in a 
high share of demand deposits. Goyal’s argument is based on the intuition that the ability of a 
bank to issue deposits at below-market rates is an important component of a bank’s charter 
value  (Keeley,  1990).  Since  demand  deposits  bear  low  (or  no  interest),  a  high  share  of 
demand deposits will indicate high market power
30. Again, the advantage of this charter-value 
measure over alternative market-power measures (such as Tobin’s q, for example) is that it is 
especially focused on deposit market participation.  
                                                
29 The results presented in Table 7 are based on the following censoring rule: the subordinated debt is accounted 
for if the share of subordinated debt in total assets is at least 0.5%. Alternative trigger points (0.01% and 1%) 
yield qualitatively the same results. 
30  This  argument  obviously  omits  the  high  non-interest  costs  a  bank  has  to  endure  in  the  maintenance  of 
transactional accounts.   26 
Table 6: All banks; bank-market level observations; loans to total assets included as a loan 







Dependant variable: bank risk
checking account rate 28.15 *** 5.81 0.07 ** 0.05
rate on federal funds purchased 827.81 *** 184.44 6.37 * 3.53
bank size -5.64 *** 1.98 -0.03 * 0.02
capitalization -417.83 *** 54.62 -1.07 * 0.68
loan growth -2.99 2.60 -0.09 0.05
loans/total assets 36.71 33.96 57.68 * 34.27
income 0.02 0.05 0.00 * 0.00
income growth -201.70 *** 56.52 -0.77 0.75
constant 29.43 36.13 0.65 * 0.36
Observations 8162 13619
R-squared 0.06 0.04
Dependant variable: checking account rate
bank risk 0.02 *** 0.00 2.14 ** 1.12
rate on federal funds purchased 15.18 ** 6.79 39.85 *** 13.19
bank size 0.08 ** 0.03 -0.16 ** 0.08
capitalization 3.44 *** 1.32 -1.39 2.46
loan growth -0.10 * 0.06 -0.50 ** 0.19
loans/total assets 0.65 0.52 -0.26 1.18
branch_deposit 10.81 *** 2.68 5.63 73.15
branches share 1.55 * 0.85 10.76 *** 3.05
market size 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
constant 0.00 0.44 1.51 1.40
Observations 8162 10220
R-squared 0.07 0.06
Dependant variable: rate on federal funds purchased
checking account rate 0.06 ** 0.03 -0.04 0.18
bank risk -0.01 ** 0.00 1.35 ** 0.55
bank size  0.01 *** 0.00 -0.04 0.03
capitalization  0.04 * 0.02 -0.45 * 0.24
loan growth  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
loans/total assets 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
effective fed funds rate  -0.01 *** 0.00 -0.02 0.02
BHC dummy 0.04 *** 0.01 0.05 0.10
FHLB dummy -0.02 ** 0.01 -0.02 ** -0.01
constant -0.18 *** 0.06 0.38 0.33
Observations 13619 13619




Note: Two-stage least squares IV estimations. Endogenous variables are: bank risk (measured by z-score, NPL), 
checking account rate and the subordinated debt rate. The sub debt rate equation is estimated using a Heckman 
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Table 7: All banks; bank-market level observations; the wholesale rate is measured by the 







Dependant variable: bank risk
checking account rate 64.03 *** 6.19 0.17 *** 0.01
rate on subordinated debt 18.81 * 10.45 -2.95 2.97
bank size -7.51 *** 1.92 0.03 *** 0.01
capitalization -498.17 *** 53.87 1.11 *** 0.11
loan growth 9.39 6.17 0.00 0.02
income -0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00
income growth -236.39 *** 112.18 -0.27 0.23
constant 40.53 43.35 -0.68 *** 0.08
Observations 5212 7139
R-squared 0.11 0.05
Dependant variable: checking account rate
bank risk 0.02 *** 0.00 5.20 *** 0.36
rate on subordinated debt 6.64 6.52 33.29 *** 4.61
bank size 0.14 *** 0.03 -0.21 *** 0.02
capitalization 6.37 *** 1.03 -5.68 *** 0.69
loan growth -0.04 0.06 -0.11 *** 0.04
branch_deposit -56.95 ** 27.98 55.60 *** 17.97
branches share 0.88 * 0.53 -0.30 0.48
market size 0.00 0.00 -0.00 *** 0.00
constant -1.44 *** 0.53 3.84 *** 0.37
Observations 5212 7139
R-squared 0.06 0.07
Dependant variable: rate on subordinated debt
checking account rate 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
bank risk 0.01 ** 0.00 1.55 ** 0.69
bank size  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
capitalization  0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.04
loan growth  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
effective fed funds rate  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BHC dummy -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
FHLB dummy 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
constant -0.05 0.08 -0.05 0.08
Observations 13619 13619





Note: Two-stage least squares IV estimations. Endogenous variables are: bank risk (measured by z-score, NPL), 
checking account rate and the subordinated debt rate. The sub debt rate equation is estimated using a Heckman 
procedure to control for potential selection bias. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 8: All banks; bank-market level observations; the wholesale rate is measured by the on 
federal funds purchased, deposit market competition is proxied by the share of demand deposits 







Dependant variable: bank risk
demand deposits/total deposits -19.21 * 11.41 -13.38 ** 6.42
rate on federal funds purchased 316.51 332.63 2.79 3.07
bank size -35.44 28.85 -0.30 0.22
capitalization -725.51 ** 318.02 -15.83 *** 5.20
loan growth -1.62 10.05 -0.08 0.11
income 0.49 0.80 0.00 0.00
income growth -901.16 ** 407.46 -0.06 4.16
constant 850.21 659.78 7.53 5.84
Observations 1558 2159
R-squared 0.07 0.06
Dependant variable: demand deposits/total deposits
bank risk 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.09
rate on federal funds purchased 3.78 2.52 1.49 1.41
bank size -0.04 0.03 0.00 0.03
capitalization -1.36 0.43 -0.70 0.42
loan growth -0.01 0.01 -0.10 0.09
branch_deposit -0.29 2.11 -4.72 5.54
branches share 0.64 0.68 0.52 0.58
market size 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
constant 0.78 0.37 0.27 0.48
Observations 1558 2159
R-squared 0.03 0.05
Dependant variable: rate on federal funds purchased
demand deposits/total deposits -0.05 0.06 0.01 0.06
bank risk 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.55
bank size  0.00 * 0.00 0.00 0.00
capitalization  -0.03 * 0.02 -0.02 0.02
loan growth  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
effective fed funds rate  0.29 *** 0.05 0.23 *** 0.09
BHC dummy -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
FHLB dummy -0.02 * 0.01 -0.02 * -0.01
constant 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02
Observations 3342 3342





Note: Two-stage least squares IV estimations. Endogenous variables are: bank risk (measured by z-score, NPL), 
demand deposits to total deposits and the rate on fed funds purchased. Bank-market level variables are averaged 
at the bank level. The fed funds rate equation is estimated using a Heckman procedure to control for potential 
selection bias. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Dependant variable: bank risk
checking account rate 33.87 *** 4.88 0.10 ** 0.06
bank size -4.71 *** 1.28 -0.04 ** 0.02
capitalization -323.35 *** 43.94 -0.81 0.61
loan growth 1.15 2.14 0.00 0.02
income 0.02 0.04 0.00 * 0.00
income growth -92.05 ** 43.34 -0.07 0.61
constant 8.03 23.94 0.77 ** 0.32
Observations 6847 9552
R-squared 0.05 0.04
Dependant variable: checking account rate
bank risk 0.02 *** 0.00 2.88 *** 0.92
bank size 0.08 *** 0.02 -0.28 *** 0.10
capitalization 3.01 *** 0.82 1.96 2.19
loan growth -0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06
branch_deposit 5.94 *** 1.76 -5.06 8.60
branches share -0.36 0.43 3.08 2.24
market size -0.01 0.00 -0.01 ** 0.00






Note: Two-stage least squares IV estimations. Endogenous variables are: bank risk (measured by z-score, NPL), 
and checking account rate.  Bank-market level  variables  are averaged at the  bank  level. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Note that the share of demand deposits to total deposits as a proxy of a bank’s competitive 
position in the deposit market is also potentially endogenous with respect to risk. This is the 
case because demand deposits represent transactional accounts with relatively high switching 
costs. 
Therefore, if depositors perceive that a bank’s risk of default is high, they may choose not to 
open  transaction  accounts  with  the  bank  in  order  to  avoid  the  risk  that  access  to  their 
transactional account could be suspended in case the bank default. Therefore, we again need 
an  instrument  for  the  ratio  of  demand  deposits  to  total  deposits.  It  turns  out  that  the 
instruments we use for the retail deposit rates (the branches per deposit ratio and the share of   30 
branches) are also valid instruments for the demand-to-total-deposits ratio. The intuition is 
that banks with widespread branch network are more likely to attract transactional deposits. 
The results of these regression specifications are illustrated in Table 8. They again indicate 
that banks with strong market power in the deposit market (with a high share of demand 
deposits) will show lower risk levels.  
And finally, we re-estimate the model ignoring the impact of the costs of wholesale funding. 
In this case, we estimate only equation (1) and equation (2). The idea of this robustness check 
is  to  address  the  potential  critique  that  the  limitations  of  our  measures  of  the  costs  of 
wholesale funding bias our results. The results of this model specification are presented in  
Table 9. They again show a very strong positive economically and statistically significant 
relation between the retail deposit rates offered by a bank and its risk. That is, banks that have 
less deposit market power and thus offer higher deposit rates are riskier.  
In  sum,  all  robustness  specifications  confirm  our  baseline  results  of  a  positive  relation 
between the intensity of competition faced by individual banks and their risk levels. 
6.  Conclusion 
Although  a  number  theoretical  studies  point  to  a  positive  link  between  deposit  market 
competition and bank risk, empirical studies have produced only mixed results. In this paper 
we revisit the debate by estimating a system of equations which describe the relation between 
deposit market competition and bank risk. Our study brings two major innovations to the 
empirical  literature  on  the  competition–risk  nexus.  First,  we  apply  a  (semi-)structural 
approach, which explicitly deals with the potential endogeneity of bank competition measures 
with respect to risk. Second, we include in the analysis the wholesale funds market. Although 
wholesale funding affects both the risk of a bank and its behaviour in the deposit market, the 
wholesale market for funds has so far been ignored in the competition and risk literature.    31 
The results of our empirical estimation show a robust positive link between the intensity of 
deposit market competition faced by a bank and the risk of the bank. We interpret these 
results as strong evidence for the risk-increasing effects of deposit market competition.  
Moreover, the results of our study show that riskier banks pay higher interest rates on their 
uninsured  wholesale  liabilities.  These  results  are  consistent  with  the  implications  of  the 
market-discipline literature (DeYoung et al., 1998, Morgan and Stiroh, 2001, and Furfine 
2001). 
In sum, our empirical results confirm the existence of a trade-off between deposit market 
competition and bank risk. Since banks offering higher deposit rates tend to undertake riskier 
strategies, bank regulators might be interested in deposit rates as a signal of bank risk and 
focus supervisory efforts on banks offering higher rates on retail deposits. In terms of policy, 
our results imply that supervising authorities should endogenize the risk effects of deposit 
market  competition  when  considering  regulations  that  aim  to  increase  banking  system 
efficiency through intensified bank market contestability.    32 
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